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ESSAY
THINKING ABOUT CIVIL DISCOVERY IN ALABAMA: USING
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS A THINKING
TOOL
Carol Rice Andrews*
Litigation abuse and decreasing lawyer professionalism, particularly in
civil discovery, is a popular theme at bar meetings and in the media. The
focus of the outcry often is deliberate discovery abuse, where lawyers
conceal or destroy information or are belligerent with opposing counsel in
discovery. This type of abuse certainly occurs, but I contend that most
lawyers do not intentionally abuse the discovery process. Instead, I believe
that there is a more pervasive problem: lawyers do not adequately think
about discovery. Many lawyers serve civil discovery requests and res-
ponses that they have not fully considered, either in terms of compliance
with the governing law or in terms of application to the particular case.
This discovery is done "by rote," which, according to Webster, means
done out of repetition and carried out mechanically or unthinkingly. 1
Rote discovery causes countless problems. It is unfair to clients, the
judicial system, and the lawyers themselves. Rote discovery is clumsy and
inefficient. It does not adequately prepare the case and wastes the client's
money. It diminishes professionalism and job satisfaction among lawyers.
The cure is relatively simple: lawyers must think more about how they
conduct civil discovery. They must think about the rules governing dis-
covery. They cannot rely on memory but instead must read and re-read the
rules. They must understand the rules. Lawyers must think about how the
rules apply to the case at hand. They must not serve the same discovery
* Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law.
1. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1267 (Encyclopedia
ed. 1964) ("[B]y memory alone, without understanding or thought."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1977 (1971) ("[T]he use of the memory usually with little intelligence
*.. ; routine carried out without understanding of its meaning or purpose .... ").
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requests and responses in case after case. They must tailor discovery to the
facts, claims, and defenses of each case.
I am not saying that lawyers do not think at all about their discovery.
Rather, my point is that most lawyers can improve discovery, and thereby
help their clients and themselves, by thinking more about the rules and
their case. Such independent judgment not only is a professional duty, it is
a primary value that clients seek from lawyers. Clients easily can retrieve
legal information and forms on the Internet, but they turn to lawyers for
insight and judgment. Lawyers must do what they alone are trained to do:
think like a lawyer.
This Essay is the first in a series in which I address the need for law-
yers "to think." This Essay focuses on civil discovery in Alabama.2 Here,
I argue that Alabama lawyers can improve their practice in both federal
and state court by more carefully considering the civil discovery practice
mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the last sixteen
years, the federal rules governing civil discovery have undergone three
sets of amendments that the Alabama rules have not incorporated. Ala-
bama lawyers should study these differences and take advantage of the
innovations of the federal rules. The aim of virtually all of the federal rule
changes is to encourage lawyers to think, cooperate, and be reasonable in
discovery. These are positive aims for all lawyers, whether they practice
in federal or state court.
Most of the new discovery procedures of federal court are adaptable to
Alabama state court. Indeed, in October 2007, the Alabama Supreme
Court in Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. directed a state trial court to
use the model of the federal rules in resolving disputes regarding discov-
ery of electronically stored information.3 This easily can be done. The
federal rule amendments regarding electronic discovery are not substantive
changes but instead explicit adaptations of pre-existing discovery standards
to the electronic setting. Because the Alabama rules have substantially the
same framework as the pre-existing federal rules, Alabama lawyers and
judges similarly may apply the Alabama rules to electronic discovery. This
adaptation need not be limited to electronic discovery. The new federal
rules aim to improve all aspects of the discovery process.
This is not to say that the federal rule amendments have achieved their
goal in federal court. Many federal court practitioners continue to conduct
2. Because this is an essay addressing rules of procedure familiar to most lawyers, I use foot-
notes and formal citations sparingly. I use footnote citations in only two instances: where the source is
not obvious to the reader (e.g., the advisory committee notes to a rule) or where quotation benefits the
reader (e.g., the full text of a federal rule provision).
3. Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So. 2d 1090, 1105 (Ala. 2007) (ordering that on
"determination as to the proper extent of discovery of... relevant [electronically stored information],
including e-mails, the trial court should consider the recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure").
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discovery without adequately thinking about either the rules or the case at
hand. All lawyers in Alabama, whether in federal or state court, need to
think carefully about civil discovery. A good starting point of that thinking
process is a study of the federal rules governing civil discovery.
THE AIMS OF THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULE AMENDMENTS
To the casual reader of the federal rules, the amendments may seem
like a confusing labyrinth of technical obstacles. A careful study of the
federal rule amendments since 1993 reveals that most are designed to im-
prove the conduct of discovery. They encourage lawyers to plan their dis-
covery. They encourage lawyers to use discovery incrementally. They
encourage lawyers to work cooperatively with the opposing side. They
encourage lawyers to be reasonable. They encourage lawyers to bring
more matters before the court.
The benefits of planning, incremental discovery, cooperation, reason-
able conduct, and judicial involvement should be obvious, but, at the risk
of stating the obvious, I will briefly highlight these benefits. First, one of
the primary aims of the new federal rules is to encourage party planning of
discovery. Planning helps the litigants and the courts. Planning makes
discovery more effective, both in terms of cost and results. Planning in-
creases the likelihood that lawyers will achieve the end result that they
intend-whether trial, summary judgment, or settlement.
Planning also helps the lawyer personally. I liken the civil discovery
process to a river voyage. Lawyers who do not plan their discovery must
feel as though they are drifting aimlessly in this voyage and at times they
may feel as though they are cascading out of control in churning rapids. A
lawyer who plans his discovery may not feel in control all of the time, but
at least he feels as though he has a boat, a paddle, and a destination.
A second aim of the federal rules is incremental use of discovery. In-
cremental discovery is a combination of ongoing planning and reaction to
discovery. It consists of asking limited, basic questions early in the dis-
covery process, followed by another set, and so on. The lawyer uses his
prior discovery to frame later discovery. It is the opposite of the more
typical scenario, in which the requesting lawyer asks for all possibly rele-
vant information in an early onslaught of broad discovery requests.
Incremental discovery is less burdensome on the responding party,
which means that the requesting party will receive far fewer burden objec-
tions and will be able to better respond to the few objections that it does
receive. Moreover, incremental discovery prevents information overload,
which often is worse than any objection. When a lawyer cannot adequately
process information gained in discovery, his discovery is as useless as
having no discovery at all, and it is far more expensive.
2009]
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A third aim is party cooperation. Cooperation and communication are
aims that lawyers often talk about but rarely achieve. In practice, many
lawyers launch discovery blindly without ever communicating with the
other side. This is misguided. Lawyers can learn much about the case by
simply talking to opposing counsel. This is not an illicit communication or
a rookie mistake by the opposing counsel, but instead a means by which
both sides benefit. Communication allows both parties to frame more tar-
geted requests that in turn make the response more efficient and less bur-
densome. In most cases, lawyers can ease and improve the discovery
process by early identifying and attempting to resolve recurring issues,
whether substantive (e.g., the relevance of a particular line of inquiry) or
procedural (e.g., waiver of privilege).
The goal of reasonable behavior likewise is an aim that most lawyers
acknowledge but often do not achieve. Lawyers take extreme positions
without thinking about the need for or repercussions of that position. Such
behavior frequently results from lack of planning and cooperation, but
reasonableness in discovery is a broader concept. It means taking reasona-
ble positions on discovery issues rather than pushing the limits of advoca-
cy.
Discovery operates under a form of honor code that requires the law-
yers to moderate their own behavior. Without self-governance, the discov-
ery process does not work effectively or fairly for either side. No amount
of judicial supervision can remedy unreasonable behavior by lawyers.
Many lawyers complain that judges refuse to get involved in discovery.
Judicial refusal to make decisions in discovery disputes may be a real
problem in some courts, but no judge can rule effectively in a case in
which the issues and facts are not sufficiently presented and narrowed. In
order to get relief in a discovery dispute, the lawyers and parties must
behave reasonably.
This leads to the final aim-judicial oversight. As noted, many law-
yers could better facilitate judicial involvement, but, under the new federal
regime, judicial involvement no longer means failure of the parties to
properly conduct discovery. To the contrary, the federal rules view judi-
cial involvement as an essential element of the proper conduct of discov-
ery. The new federal rules seek to increase judicial involvement through
several two-tiered discovery procedures. In the first tier, the parties may
conduct discovery within specified limits, and any discovery beyond these
limits-the second tier-is a question for the court. That a party seeks dis-
covery in the second tier does not mean that either lawyer acted inappro-
priately. Such discovery very well may be proper, but the court must
make that determination. Lawyers must recognize and respect the mechan-
ics of the two-tiered procedures. As in all discovery matters, they must
plan and act reasonably.
[Vol. 60:3:683
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These aims are not unique to the current federal rules. To varying de-
grees, earlier versions of the federal rules (and the Alabama rules) had
these aims. The innovation of the three sets of federal amendments since
1993 is that the federal rules now more overtly require or encourage plan-
ning, incremental discovery, cooperation, reasonable behavior, and judi-
cial involvement. The federal rules have not achieved perfection, but they
bring lawyers and parties closer to these aims through a variety of proce-
dural requirements.
MANDATORY CONFERENCING AND SCHEDULING ORDERS
The federal rules now require the parties to confer early in the case,
first with each other and then with the court. Federal Rule 26(f) states that
"parties must confer as soon as practicable," and that in this conference
they "must consider" discovery issues such as preservation of information
and "must ... develop a proposed discovery plan."' The importance of
this mandatory planning conference is underscored by Rule 26(d), which
prohibits the parties from initiating any discovery until after the confe-
rence. After the parties confer, Rule 16(b) requires the court to hold a
conference with the parties and enter a scheduling order. That order must
set a discovery cut-off date and may dictate other discovery matters, such
as modifications on the extent of discovery, explicit procedures for dis-
covery of electronic information, and procedures for asserting claims of
privilege (or waiver of privilege).'
4. Federal Rule 26(f)(3) mandates:
A discovery plan must state the parties' views and proposals on:
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures
under Rule 26(a), including a statement of when initial disclosures were made or will
be made;
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be com-
pleted, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or fo-
cused on particular issues;
(C) any issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, in-
cluding the form or forms in which it should be produced;
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials,
including-if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production-
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;
(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these
rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(F) any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b)
and (c).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). Federal Rule 16(b)(3)(B) provides:
The scheduling order may: (i) modify the timing of disclosures under Rules 26(a) and
26(e)(1); (ii) modify the extent of discovery; (iii) provide for disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information; (iv) include any agreements the parties reach for asserting
claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material after information is pro-
duced ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B).
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Alabama has similar conferencing provisions, but they are not manda-
tory. Alabama Rule 26(f) provides that "the court may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of dis-
covery." Similarly, Alabama Rule 16(b) provides that the "court may en-
ter a scheduling order that limits the time . . . to complete discovery."
Moreover, the Alabama rules do not require the parties to confer before
they commence discovery.
Alabama lawyers should not treat early planning conferences as op-
tional in state court. The mandatory conferencing provisions of the 1993
federal rule amendments were so successful that federal rulemakers in
2000 removed the ability of districts to opt out of conferencing by local
rule.6 Lawyers in state court should take this cue and initiate conferencing
on their own. They can use Federal Rule 26(f) as an initial checklist for
topics to discuss in their state court conferences. They can use the manda-
tory provisions of Federal Rules 16(b) and 26(f) as support for their re-
quests to state court judges to use their discretion under Alabama Rule
16(b) and require such conferences and planning. Likewise, lawyers in
federal court should not view the mandatory sessions as mere gesture.
They should take advantage of this opportunity to think about and plan
their discovery and develop a meaningful plan of action.
PRESUMPTIVE LIMITS ON INTERROGATORIES AND DEPOSITIONS
A second way in which the federal rules promote better planning of
discovery is through the use of presumptive numerical limits. Federal Rule
33 limits the number of interrogatories to twenty-five. Rule 30 limits the
number of depositions to ten per side. Rule 30 also limits the length of
depositions to one seven-hour day. Presumptive limits are two-tiered de-
vices, in that the requesting party is entitled to the discovery within the
stated limit without court order (the first tier) and may get additional dis-
covery only with leave of court (the second tier).
The federal rules did not invent presumptive limits. Indeed, before the
federal courts did so, Alabama courts in 1990 imposed a presumptive limit
of forty interrogatories, in response to "the concern for abuse by the pro-
pounding of 'canned' interrogatories."' The Alabama limit has not been
universally popular. Some Alabama lawyers complain that the limit is ar-
bitrary and/or not enforced.
Lawyers and judges must realize that presumptive limits are positive
devices-for both the requesting and responding parties. Presumptive lim-
6. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(t) advisory committee's note (2000) ("The Committee has been informed
that the addition of the conference was one of the most successful changes made in the 1993 amend-
ments, and it therefore has determined to apply the conference requirement nationwide.").
7. ALA. R. Civ. P. 33(a) committee comments (effective Oct. 1, 1990).
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its are not arbitrary restrictions but instead legitimate means to control and
focus discovery-if used correctly. Parties should not routinely stipulate
out of these limits. Courts should not routinely change the limits in the
initial scheduling order. Courts should not have a practice of routinely
granting or denying later motions for extensions beyond the limits. Each
party must consider themselves governed by the presumptive limit and
conduct their discovery accordingly. If the lawyer thinks carefully about
his first twenty-five (or forty) interrogatories, he may never need to file a
motion for leave to serve additional interrogatories. On the other hand, if
and when he finds himself in need of additional interrogatories, his judi-
cious use of the first allotment should be a key factor in the court's deci-
sion to grant additional interrogatories.
This means that lawyers must plan and really think about each interro-
gatory they serve. They should treat the interrogatory as a precious com-
modity. Waste of interrogatories is legendary. Most lawyers have seen
extreme examples-interrogatories in a commercial case requesting medi-
cal or smoking history of a corporate entity-but lesser examples of inapt
interrogatories recur with alarming frequency. Such lack of thinking is
inexcusable, but proper use of interrogatories requires more thought than
merely avoiding obviously inapt interrogatories.
Judicious use of interrogatories requires lawyers to realize the inherent
and practical limits of the interrogatory device. A well-known practical
reality of interrogatory practice is that the opposing lawyer controls the
substantive answers. This means that interrogatories asking for narratives
usually are wasted efforts. By contrast, interrogatories as to the opponent's
contentions or claims are productive precisely because the opposing law-
yer is drafting the substantive response. Likewise, interrogatories as to
basic facts, such as dates and names, are effective because the opposing
lawyer often knows these facts first-hand and cannot easily distort the
substantive answers.
In addition, a thinking lawyer will not use up his allotted interrogato-
ries early in the discovery process. He will save some interrogatories for
later in the case. This staggered use of interrogatories is part of the prac-
tice of incremental discovery. Moreover, some interrogatories are substan-
tively more effective near the end of the discovery period. For example,
an interrogatory paired with a request to admit, served late in the discov-
ery process, can be an effective tool to prepare for trial or summary judg-
ment.8 In addition, as I explain below, some interrogatories are necessary
8. The pairing might be as follows:
Request to Admit #5: Admit that the [description] contract is valid.
Interrogatory #21: If the answer to Request to Admit #5 is any statement other than an une-




late in discovery to compensate for gaps in the duty of supplementation.
The presumptive limit on interrogatories is not at odds with this need for
late use of interrogatories. To the contrary, presumptive limits should mo-
tivate lawyers to think more carefully about interrogatories, both in terms
of content and timing.
Presumptive limits also can benefit deposition practice. Alabama state
courts do not put a presumptive limit on depositions, but all Alabama law-
yers should take the signal from the federal rules and limit their use of
depositions in terms of both quantity and length. Depositions are costly.
There is no need to depose every person with potential information. It is a
waste of time and money and often ineffective strategy. Interviews, sup-
plemented in some cases by witness statements, may be enough to serve
the client's needs. Once the lawyer identifies the deponents, the conduct of
the depositions requires extensive planning. Lawyers must prepare and
think about the broad issues (e.g., the ultimate aims of the deposition and
its place in the specific litigation), lines of questioning (e.g., the different
ways to get a particular point), and technical issues (e.g., use of docu-
ments). Such planning can reduce the length of most depositions to well
within a single day.
Presumptive limits do not work the same benefits for all forms of dis-
covery. For example, the federal rules wisely do not place presumptive
limits on document requests. Such limits might encourage lawyers to make
very broad requests rather than narrowly tailored requests. By not putting
presumptive limits on document requests, the federal rules give lawyers
greater freedom to serve precise requests and incrementally ask for docu-
ments.
AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURES
The most controversial amendment to the federal discovery rules was
the 1993 addition of automatic disclosures. Automatic disclosures require
a party to produce information even though the opposing party has not yet
served a formal discovery request. Because the duty to disclose is automat-
ic-a departure from the traditional request-based format-many lawyers
have had difficulty adjusting to the concept. The automatic disclosure du-
ty, however, has important aims and benefits.
One aim of the initial disclosure duties is incremental discovery-the
information gained in the initial disclosures enables the receiving party to
better frame later discovery requests. Another aim is to reduce unneces-
sary paperwork by requiring automatic disclosure of material that most
lawyers otherwise would request through formal discovery. 9 The disclo-
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee's note (1993) ("A major purpose ... is to
accelerate the exchange of basic information.. . and to eliminate the paper work involved in request-
[Vol. 60:3:683
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sure duties are relatively modest. The two generic initial disclosure provi-
sions are limited to only material favorable to the disclosing party. Federal
Rule 26(a)(1), requiring a listing or persons with knowledge of informa-
tion ° and a description or production of documents," limits these disclo-
sures to information and documents that the disclosing party may use to
support its case. The remaining two initial disclosure provisions are tar-
geted to specific types of information commonly sought in litigation. Rule
26(a)(1) requires disclosure of basic information concerning any party's
damages claims and liability insurance policies. Federal Rules 26(a)(2) and
(3) similarly provide for automatic disclosure, later in the case, of com-
mon expert and final trial materials.
The disclosure provisions should inform the practice of all lawyers in
Alabama, in both state and federal court. Lawyers in Alabama state court
need not advocate for adoption of automatic disclosure duties, but they
should use the federal disclosure provisions as a cue for their request-
based discovery. They should follow the example of the disclosures and
use their requests incrementally, asking for information similar in sub-
stance to the federal disclosures. After all, the federal rulemakers deemed
this information so fundamental as to warrant production in almost every
federal civil case.12 Alabama lawyers should not do so unthinkingly. They
should not mirror exactly the federal disclosure provisions but instead con-
sider a similar but broader request-for example, an interrogatory asking
for persons with knowledge of key events, not just the persons with infor-
mation favorable to the other side. For the same reasons, lawyers in feder-
al court must realize that the automatic disclosure provisions are narrow
and are not substitutes for broader discovery requests.
SUPPLEMENTATION
Federal rulemakers added the original supplementation duty in 1970,
after much confusion and controversy about a party's duty to update or
correct its prior discovery responses. The 1970 federal rule, now embo-
died in Alabama Rule 26(e), was a compromise. It signaled its limited
requirements by speaking in negative terms ("no duty to supplement...
ing such information . ").
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) ("[T]he name and, if known, the address and telephone number
of each individual likely to have discoverable information-along with the subjects of that informa-
tion-that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be
solely for impeachment.").
11. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) ("[A] copy-or a description by category and location-of all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its
possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be
solely for impeachment.").
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee's note (1993) (describing the disclosure duty
as applying to "certain basic information that is needed in most cases").
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except").' 3 In 1993, the federal rules enhanced the duty. The current fed-
eral rule speaks in positive terms ("a party ... must supplement") and
requires lawyers to update and correct all responses, except deposition
testimony. 14
The supplementation duty requires careful consideration not only by
the lawyer for the responding party but also by the requesting lawyer. The
responding lawyer must make certain that his client is in compliance with
the duty, and the requesting lawyer must ensure that his discovery is
phrased and timed such that he gets the most complete response possible.
This understanding is particularly important for Alabama lawyers who
face different duties in federal and state court.
The difference in duty means that lawyers in federal court may send,
early in discovery, an interrogatory asking the opponent to flesh out the
factual bases for allegations in pleadings, knowing that the opposing law-
yer must update the response as he learns more in discovery. Lawyers in
state court will not be as sure. They must wait and serve some interrogato-
ries near the end of discovery, in order to ensure complete responses, but
they also must not serve the interrogatories so late that they cannot react to
the answers. For example, a lawyer in state court must time an interroga-
tory concerning the opponent's damages claims late enough so that the
response is complete but early enough to allow the requesting lawyer to
conduct discovery as to the damages claims.
Alabama lawyers can avoid this uncertainty by stipulating that both
sides will supplement their discovery responses. Alabama Rule 26(e) en-
courages such agreements. It expressly provides that the parties may en-
hance the duty of supplementation through party agreement or order of the
court." The federal duty is an easy model to adopt.
13. ALA. R. CIv. P. 26(e) (limiting duty to supplement to expert discovery, "the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters," and to other responses where the
responding party "(A) knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) knows that the re-
sponse, though correct when made, is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to
amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment").
14. Federal Rule 26(e)(1) provides in part:
A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)-or who has responded to an in-
terrogatory, request for production, or request for admission-must supplement or correct
its disclosure or response:
(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure
or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process
or in writing ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(e)(l)(A).
15. ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(3) ("A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new requests for supplementation
of prior responses.").
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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
In 2006, federal rulemakers amended virtually every rule governing
discovery in order to better address discovery of electronically stored in-
formation (ESI). Most of these amendments are modest in that they adapt
existing discovery standards to ESI rather than change the substantive
standards. The most significant new federal rule governing electronic dis-
covery is Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 16 It is a two-tiered device that focuses on
searches of electronically stored information. It directs the responding
party to search all sources of ESI that are reasonably accessible, in terms
of cost and burden, and produce all responsive information from those
sources. The responding party does not have to search sources that are not
reasonably accessible but instead must identify the sources not searched in
its response. The requesting party then must assess whether it is satisfied
with the produced information and the search. If not, the requesting party
must bring the matter before the court to decide whether the responding
party must search the other sources and which party must pay for that
search.
This is the procedure that the Alabama Supreme Court identified in Ex
parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. as a good model for state court judges to
follow. State judges and lawyers can use Alabama Rule 26(b)(1) to employ
this procedure. Alabama Rule 26(b)(1) provides for balancing of the bene-
fit and burden of any form of discovery. " Prior to 2006, federal courts
used this balancing provision to address ESI discovery disputes. New Fed-
eral Rule 26(b)(2)(B) essentially is a standardized application of that ba-
lancing test to a particular issue-sources that are not reasonably searcha-
ble.
The 2006 federal rule amendments also added provisions addressing
the form in which a party must produce ESI. The form of production-
whether, for example, in hard copy, portable document format (PDF), or
original (native) software-is a recurring problem with ESI. Federal Rule
34(b) allows the requesting party to specify the form of production, and
the rule also permits the responding party to object to the requested form
16. Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
17. Alabama Rule 26(b)(1) instructs the court to limit discovery when "the discovery is unduly
burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limita-
tions on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." ALA. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). An almost identical provision remains in Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
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and state an alternative form of production. Rule 34(b)(2)(E) sets a default
standard for requests that do not specify the form: the responding party
may produce in the form in which the ESI is ordinarily maintained or in
any other reasonably usable form.
Federal Rule 37, the rule governing discovery sanctions, added a
modest provision addressing preservation of ESI. The amendment "focus-
es on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine alteration
and deletion of information that attends ordinary use."8 Rule 37(e) directs
a court not to impose sanctions on a party for failure to provide ESI "lost
as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system." This addition acts more as a reminder than a substantive change.
By definition, it applies only to reasonable behavior, which courts rarely
should sanction in any application. Yet, the new rule is an important re-
minder of a recurring problem-ESI preservation-and the need to be rea-
sonable. 9
ESI easily can overwhelm lawyers, clients, and judges. Because ESI is
an application that is evolving in terms of law, technology, and awareness,
the need for reasonableness is particularly profound. The federal provi-
sions are reasonable solutions to some of the vexing problems of ESI-
solutions that lawyers practicing in state court should consider. ESI dis-
covery is not unique to federal court. ESI issues arise in all cases. Ala-
bama lawyers should take the cue from the federal rules, but they should
not limit themselves to the particular solutions of the federal rules. They
should consider and be reasonable with respect to all aspects of ESI dis-
covery, whether in federal or state court. A lawyer, for example, should
assess what information his client actually needs and not insist upon an
exhaustive search of every byte of information.
PRIVILEGE WAIVER
The 2006 federal amendments added another two-tiered device to ad-
dress a recurring issue of privilege-inadvertent waiver. This addition was
part of the electronic discovery amendments, but the issue is not unique to
ESI. Privilege waiver always has been a risk in discovery-causing costly
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note (2006).
19. The advisory committee highlighted preservation of ESI as a particularly important issue to
discuss in the initial conferences:
The parties' discussion should pay particular attention to the balance between the com-
peting needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine operations critical to on-
going activities. Complete or broad cessation of a party's routine computer operations could
paralyze the party's activities. The parties should take account of these considerations in
their discussions, with the goal of agreeing on reasonable preservation steps.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006) (citation omitted).
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and time-consuming privilege review-but the large volume and dynamic
nature of ESI compound the risks, costs, and delays.2'
Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) sets a new procedure for addressing inadver-
tent production and belated claims of privilege. First, the rule provides
that a party who has produced a document but who claims privilege on the
document must notify the other side. Upon receiving such notice, the re-
ceiving party has a choice: destroy or return the document, or bring the
privilege and waiver issue before the court. If the receiving party chooses
to bring the issue before the court, the receiving party must sequester the
document and not use it until judicial resolution. The federal rules do not
address the substantive waiver decision, but Rule 26(f) and Rule 16(b)
encourage the parties and court to consider establishing both procedural
and substantive waiver standards early in the case.
The Alabama rules do not address the procedure for addressing late
assertions of privilege and related claims of waiver. Yet, lawyers in state
court either can agree themselves to use the federal procedure or ask the
state court to order such procedure. At a minimum, the federal provisions
are a reminder to lawyers practicing in state court to consider and discuss
such procedures and issues early in the case.
CONCLUSION
The federal rules governing civil discovery are a good starting point
for all lawyers in their effort to think more fully about their discovery
practice. For lawyers practicing in federal court, the new rules are re-
quired procedures that in every case warrant careful study and reflection.
For lawyers practicing in state court, the new federal rules are a useful
comparative study to better understand the Alabama state court rules. The
federal rules also act as a cue to possible procedures and behavior that will
improve discovery in state court. Whether conducting discovery in federal
or state court, study of the federal discovery rules will help Alabama law-
yers fulfill their basic duty: thinking like a lawyer.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note (2006) ("The Committee has repeatedly been
advised about the discovery difficulties that can result from efforts to guard against waiver of privilege
and work-product protection.... The volume of [ESI] data, and the informality that attends use of e-
mail and some other types of [ESI], may make privilege determinations more difficult, and privilege
review correspondingly more expensive and time consuming.").
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